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I. THE OPINION
Law is currently perceived by many as a set of technicalities
used to keep criminals out of jail. Even those lawyers opposed to
the Warren Court expansion of constitutional rights see such a
view as an oversimplification, a shibboleth - a shibboleth, how-
ever, to which the facts in Michigan v. Long' seem tailor-made.
One night, in a rural area, a car was travelling erratically and at
excessive speed. It swerved into a ditch. Police officers stopped
to investigate. The car's occupant, who was at the rear of the car,
and "appeared to be under the influence of something," failed to
respond to a request for registration and license. He turned and
began walking to the open door of the car. The officers, who
were following, saw a knife on the floorboard, whereupon they
stopped the occupant and subjected him to a patdown search.
The personal search revealed no weapons. One of the officer's
flashlights, however, revealed something protruding from under
an arm rest. Inspection produced an open pouch containing what
appeared to be marihuana, and although nothing was revealed
by a further search of the car's interior, the officers, following an
arrest for possession of marihuana, decided to impound the vehi-
cle. More marihuana was subsequently found in the trunk.
The trial court, holding that the personal search was valid
under Terry v. Ohio,2 denied a motion by defendant to suppress
the marihuana taken from the car's interior. Terry upheld a pat-
down search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to
arrest on the ground that police officers must be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to protect themselves from threatened
harm. The court also admitted the contents of the trunk as the
product of a valid inventory search on the authority of South
Dakota v. Opperman.3
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
2392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that Terry did not
cover the search of the car's interior. As to the marihuana found
in the trunk, without considering the applicability of Opperman,
the Michigan Supreme Court barred evidentiary use of the mari-
huana on the grounds that it was the "fruit" of that search. Michi-
gan precedents had historically been interpreted to provide
broader protection against searches and seizures than that guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment, and there were two refer-
ences to the Michigan Constitution in the State Supreme Court's
opinion.
Holding that the Michigan Supreme Court's interpretation of
Terry was in error, the Supreme Court of the United States
remanded the case of Michigan v. Long for a decision on
whether or not the trial court's interpretation of Oppertman was
correct, whether the marihuana found in the trunk was validly
admitted into evidence. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dis-
sent, argued that Justice O'Connor, writing for the court, was
making of Terry a precedent involving searches incident to a
valid arrest, which they characterized as a misreading of that
decision.
Their argument, in simplest terms, is that patdown searches
must be distinguished from searches incident to arrest, and thus
that the Michigan Supreme Court had been correct in refusing to
treat Terry as requiring admission of the marihuana into evi-
dence. The resolution of the issues raised by this argument
depends, of course, on the choice of policy in terms of which
Terry is applied to the facts before the Court, on the question
whether, in light of those facts, it is more important to protect
police officers from potential harm or to effectuate a constitu-
tional guarantee: on the question, in other words, whether Terry
should be read broadly or restrictively.
A. The Law.
The federal structure of our society means that the United
States Supreme Court is supreme only on matters of federal law:
that state law, whether pronounced by the judiciary, the execu-
tive, or the legislature, must be taken as authoritative by the
federal tribunal insofar as the question being resolved is a matter
1985]
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governed by state rather than federal law. Thus, Michigan v.
Long was remanded to ascertain the views of the Michigan judi-
ciary on the question governed, for purposes of federal law, by
the Opperman precedent. In resolving a controversy, in other
words, the United States Supreme Court may be bound by pro-
positions of law enunciated by state authorities, and it is this
situation that underlies the divergence of views in Michigan v.
Long.
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, holds that:
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the
cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where
there is an adequate and independent state ground....
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision
fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be inter-
woven with federal law, and when the adequacy and inde-
pendence of any possible state law ground is not clear from
the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasona-
ble explanation that the state court decided the case the way
it did because it believed that federal law required it to do
so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal prece-
dents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions,
then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its
judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used
only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves
compel the result that the court has reached.4
Justice O'Connor is making explicit how the federal Supreme
Court decides whether or not to review the decision arrived at by
state authorities in a matter where both state and federal law are
arguably relevant, and where the state tribunal cites to both.
It is this holding that provokes Justice Stevens' dissent. His
opinion concludes:
I am thoroughly baffled by the Court's suggestion that it
must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of the
Michigan Supreme Court in order to show [r]espect for the
independence of state courts .... Would we show respect
for the Republic of Finland by convening a special sitting
for the sole purpose of declaring that its decision to release
an American citizen was based upon a misunderstanding of
American law?5
4 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475-3476 (1983).
51 d., at 3492.
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Justice Stevens' argument rests on the proposition "that in
reviewing the decisions of state courts, the primary role of this
Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal
rights have been fairly heard."6 Until recently," his argument
goes, "we had virtually no interest in cases [where it was the State
complaining about the judicial interpretation of the meaning of
the constitutional guarantee]." 7 What he is arguing, in other
words, is that the relevant question is not how Terry should be
read, but the proper distribution of power between state and
federal courts. That this is in fact the argument being made is
underlined by the opening words of the dissent:
The jurisprudential questions presented in this case are far
more important than the question whether the Michigan
police officer's search of respondent's care violated the
Fourth Amendment. The case raises profoundly significant
questions concerning the relationship between two sover-
eigns the State of Michigan and the United States of
America. 8
The question raised is whether, in the situation presented by
Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court should focus
its energies on ascertaining the meaning of precedents or on
ensuring that political realities be fully taken into account. Only if
the latter focus is entitled to priority does it seem proper to treat
as decisive the fact that federal courts were established to vindi-
cate rather than to define federal rights. The question, however,
is one that inevitably arises in connection with the work of the
judiciary in any federal structure and it ultimately forces consid-
eration of the extent to which political considerations provide a
sufficient basis for analysis of a legal system.
II. THE DOCTRINE
A. Precedents.
The Supreme Court of the United States held the Fourth
Amendment applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.9 In Mapp,
the Warren Court reversed, by a vote of 6 to 3, a decision by the
Supreme Court of Ohio which had upheld a conviction for
6 Id., at 3490.
7 1d.. at 3491.8 Id.. at 3489.
9367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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knowing possession of obscene materials, despite the fact that
the materials were the product of an unlawful search.
The Mapp facts can, without exaggeration, be described as
"aggravated." The police doing the searching claimed that a war-
rant existed but refused to show it, they applied force to recover
the document claimed to be the warrant from the person whose
house was being searched, and who had taken the document
from the policeman who had refused to show it, and the informa-
tion on the basis of which the search was undertaken did not
relate to obscenity. 0
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that a "reasonable
argument" could be made that "the 'methods' employed to
obtain the [evidence] .... were such as to offend "a sense of
justice," .... but it found determinative that the evidence had not
been taken "from defendant's person by the use of brutal or
offensive physical force against defendant."' On the question of
law, the State of Ohio argued in the Supreme Court of the United
States that Wolf v. Colorado,'2 stood for the proposition that a
state was not prevented from using unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in its courts.
The Mapp opinion did not dispute the conclusion found deter-
minative by the Ohio Supreme Court about the nature of the
force used. Nor did it deny that Wolf v. Colorado had held "that
in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure."' 3
The United States Supreme Court Mapp opinion began,
instead, by noting that:
Seventy-five years ago, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886), considering the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as running 'almost into each other' on the facts before
it, this Court held that the doctrines of those Amendments'
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. . ..
10 ld., at 644.
" See Id., at 645.12338 U.S. 25 (1949).
1,367 U.S. 643. 645-646 (1961.
14 d., at 646 (footnotes omitted).
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Having thus read Boyd as a precedent establishing a right to
privacy, Justice Clark, writing for the Court, had no difficulty in
overruling Wolf on the basis that a right was violated when
unconstitutionally seized evidence was used at trial.
Justice Harlan, writing for himself and Justices Frankfurter
and Whitaker, dissented on the basis that the Fourth Amend-
ment, "by penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deter-
ring such conduct in the future,"'15 and that "I [therefore] do not
see how it can be said that a trial becomes unfair simply because
a State determines that evidence may be considered by the trier
of fact, regardless of how it was obtained, if it is relevant to the
one issue with which the trial is concerned, the guilt or innocence
of the accused."16 Justice Clark justified his focus on the enforce-
ment of the constitutional guarantee rather than the purpose of
the criminal trial by surveying the difficulties experienced by
states in attempting to develop effective remedies against offi-
cers who violated the rules governing searches and seizures. 17
Since only three other Justices joined Justice Clark's opinion,
however, Mapp did not itself hold that the Fourth Amendment
could validly be interpreted as affording an effective remedy. It
held only that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Fourth
Amendment to the states.
The Harlan dissent noted "that what has been done is not likely
to promote respect either for the Court's adjudicatory process or
for the stability of its decisions ."1s Justice Harlan's complaint was
that the argument heard by the Court had centered, not on the
Fourth Amendment, but on the First, on the constitutionality of a
statute punishing knowing possession or control of obscene mate-
rial, and Justice Stewart:
Agreeing . . . with . . . Mr. Justice Harlan ... express[ed]
no view as to the constitutional issue which the Court today
decides [but] would... reverse.. because I am persuaded
that the [statutory] provision ... upon which the petitioner's




'1 d., at 672, 677.
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not 'consistent with the rights of free thought and expression
assured against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'19
The Court rendering the Mapp opinion, therefore, had it only
been willing to rule on the issue to which argument had been
directed, might well have produced a majority for reversal of the
conviction it was reviewing, although a decision holding uncon-
stitutional the statute on which the conviction was based would
produce a majority or plurality different from the one that
agreed on the Court's opinion in Mapp. How is one to account
for this situation, how explain the fact that, as Justice Harlan
noted, what the Mapp Court did was to "choose [to] answer [the
more difficult and less appropriate of the two questions] pre-
sented by the facts"? 0
B. The Meaning of the Precedents.
Questions about Warren Court decisions are now of historical
interest. They are valuable to the extent that their answers shed
light on the activities of the Justices currently making law. From
this perspective, the important question raised by Michigan v.
Long is not whether, on the facts presented, the Fourth Amend-
ment applied, but rather why Justice Stevens refused to accept
the Court's definition of the question presented, why he
regarded the issue of federalism as more significant than the issue
of law.
One answer to this question is that Justice Stevens is "realistic"
about judicial power, and fears that, under the guise of offering a
formula for determining the adequacy of the state ground, Mich-
igan v. Long ensures that federal constitutional guarantees will
not be read broadly by state courts. Such an interpretation
accounts for Justice Stevens' stress on the fact that federal courts
were created to vindicate rights.
This answer, however, by focusing on the impact of the partic-
ular decision, overlooks the fact that the Court is a continuing
body, whose composition necessarily changes over time. Even
an accurate reading of the future, of the positions new justices
would take, would not provide a sufficient basis on which to
19 Id.. at 672.
10Id., at 672, 675.
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arrive at a conclusion about the meaning of either the constitu-
tional text or the judicial precedent. Thus, if Michigan v. Long, as
a restrictive reading of Terry, is accounted for by the conserva-
tive nature of the Burger Court, then Mapp can be read as a
refusal to follow the precedent of Wolf v. Colorado, accounted
for by the liberal nature of the Warren Court.
The question in cases involving the Bill of Rights is whether
citizens may or may not perform certain actions under certain
circumstances, and how a court resolves that issue depends on its
choice of policy. That choice can be analyzed in terms of the
attitude that underlies the Mapp result or the vision that informs
the Long decision, but it is not realistic to treat that attitude and
vision either as equivalents or as substitutes for law. A realism
that treats the conclusion "It's the law" as equivalent to the state-
ment "It's the liberal thing to do" or "It's the conservative way of
doing things" has defined law as a branch of politics, and, in so
doing, disregards the special nature both of American federalism
and United States law.
C. The Dissent in Michigan v. Long.
To attribute motive, moreover, is a slippery business. Justice
Stevens filed a dissent, it could be said, because Justices Holmes
and Brandeis made of the dissent a respectable institution, and
they did so in the name of realism about the Court's attempted
use of its power to halt needed economic and social reforms. As
Justice Holmes put it, in typically memorable language: "This
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain .... The Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."'"
The "realism" embodied in the Holmes and Brandeis dissents
portrayed the Court as an entity wedded to an outmoded set of
economic and social theories, and it was in this context, the con-
text of an era in which economic processes long taken for
granted were no longer producing benefits, that a Brandeis dis-
sent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann22 identified the values
inherent in a federal structure: "It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."3
21 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
-285 U.S. 262 (1932).
23Id., at 311.
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Justice Brandeis' New State Ice rationale, however, ignored a
good deal of history. Thus, in the years following the Civil War,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution's commerce
clause to prevent local and state communities from imposing
restrictions on the national market opened by the processes of
industrialization. The Constitution, in other words, once the Civil
War had ensured that the society it established was governed
from Washington, was a document whose interpretation became
consonant with the provision of economic benefits. The Court
discovered, during the New Deal, that its success at denying state
and local governments the right to regulate economic activity did
not give it sufficient power to prevent other branches of the
federal government from undertaking that role.
The New Deal created a set of federal administrative agencies
that joined the judiciary in prescribing boundaries for permissi-
ble state economic experimentation. The Supreme Court's
response to this situation was to shift the thrust of its activity to an
unoccupied area. The focus of the decisions produced by the
Warren Court was on social rather than economic activity, the
pursuit of individual expression rather than economic benefits;
and it is the meaning of those precedents that must be elucidated
by the Burger Court.
If we frame the issue raised for the Court in Michigan v. Long
by Justice Brandeis' New State Ice dissent as the proper attitude
towards state experimentation, it is important to note that
Holmes took a strikingly different view. What Justice Holmes
said, also in dissent, was:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the
Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of
its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an
important part of the community desires, in the insulated
chambers afforded by the several States, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to
those whose judgment I most respect.24
Justice Holmes justified his less optimistic approach to Justice
Brandeis: "Generally speaking, I agree with you in liking to see
social experiments tried but I do so without enthusiasm because I
24 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921).
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believe it is merely shifting the pressure and that so long as we
have free propagation Malthus is right in his general view."'25
This pessimism underlay the approach Holmes' took, not only
to federalism and experimentation, but also in defining the
nature of law. The basis on which Justice Holmes concluded, in
1897, that "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law," is as
follows:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must
look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to pre-
dict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside it, in the vaguer sanction of
conscience."26
In terms of Michigan v. Long, if Justice Holmes is correct
about the nature of the human being the law can realistically
hope to govern, it is clear that Terry should not be read broadly,
that the rights of criminal defendants should not, except when
the text compels it, be given priority over the rights of the police.
It remains to establish the connection between Holmes' view of
the law and the dissent filed by Justice Stevens.
III. THE MEANING OF MICHIGAN V. LONG
A. The Law of the Precedents.
If there was an ideology that underlay the work of the Warren
Court, it was that of Justice Hugo Black, an ideology of plain
meaning, of words that mean what they say, of a Protestant
fundamentalism applied to the words of the Bill of Rights. Given
that ideology, Justice Black was uncomfortable with the court
arrogating to itself the power to promulgate constitutional guar-
antees, and he concurred in Wolf v. Colorado explicitly on the
basis that the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amend-
ment functioned solely as a judicially created rule of evidence
reversible by Congress. He joined the Mapp Court solely on the
basis that reflection had persuaded him of the correctness of the
Boyd amalgamation of the Fourth and Fifth amendments, which
25 Holmes to Brandeis, April 20, 1919. Manuscript in the Library of the Law School
of the University of Louisville.
26 The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461, 459 (1897).
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Justice Clark cited as establishing a constitutional right not to
have evidence used against one.
Two cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court after Wolf, one
involving the admission of testimony gathered by concealed mi-
crophones and state use of information obtained by federal tax-
ing authorities, 27 and the other involving evidence obtained by
use of a stomach pump, 28 constituted the basis for Justice Black's
reconsideration of Wolf. In both cases, he had relied solely on the
Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause to reverse the con-
victions. In terms of the precedents created by the two cases,
however, the only doctrine one could extract from the multiple
opinions filed was that convictions which "shocked the con-
science" of five Justices would be reversed. In order to end the
uncertainty created by these cases, to restore plain meaning to
constitutional guarantees, Justice Black in Mapp "depart[ed]
from my prior views . . . accept[ed] the Boyd doctrine as con-
trolling in this state case and . . . join[ed] the Court's judgment
and opinion which are in accordance with that constitutional
doctrine."2 9
Justice Black's "reconsideration" of Wolf v. Colorado, the basis
for the proposition of law established by Mapp, can be seen,
then, as an expansion, in the service of an ideology of plain
meaning, of federal constitutional guarantees against the actions
of state authorities, an attempt to make the law more certain, to
clarify the meaning of opinions rendered by the federal Supreme
Court. Justice Holmes might have approved Black's attempt,
since he believed that "the chief end of man is to form general
propositions;" but Holmes also thought the effort fruitless, since
he believed that "no general proposition is worth a damn."3 0
The basis for this "realistic" pessimism is the artificiality of
using words as guides to conduct. Examination of the "clear and
present danger" test Justice Holmes coined in Schenck v. United
States2' provides an opportunity to test the validity of this pes-
simism. In dissent in Abrams v. United States, 32 joined by Justice
27 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
2SRochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).29367 U.S. 643. 661. 666.
,
0See 2 HOLMES-POLLACK LETTRs 13.
31249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919).
32250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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Brandeis, Justice Holmes sets out the theory that for him justifies
adoption of the "clear and present danger" formula: "time has
upset many fighting faiths" 33 and it therefore follows that "the
best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in




Let us accept the implicit propositions that a broad reading of
the First Amendment is justified in that it promotes the promul-
gation of truths and that history is a reliable guide to action. It
nevertheless remains unclear how, if at all, Holmes' "competitive
market" theory, even if valid, makes the "clear and present
danger" test either possible or reliable. Indeed, Justice Homes in
Abrams was careful to distance himself from his argument. He
sets out his theory, and then says: "That at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. '" 35
The ideology of "plain meaning" inheres in the approach of the
Warren Court to the problem of obscenity and the First Amend-
ment. Rather than coin a phrase analogous to "clear and present
danger," Roth v. United States,36 held simply that obscenity was
not speech. Subsequent opinions struggled to identify obscene
material, and the result was a situation remarkably similar to the
one which underlay Justice Black's reconsideration of Wolf v.
Colorado. Indeed, in 1964, a Justice Stewart concurrence made
clear that what "shocked the conscience," in obscenity cases, was
a purely personal matter: "I shall not attempt . . . to define the
kinds of material I understand to be obscene; and perhaps I shall
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it
and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. '" 37
Justice Stewart's opinion is effective but troubling. It demon-
strates the inadequacy of the approach taken by Justice Black,
and raises the question whether the impact of a judicial opinion is
the product of an effective literary style.
33 1d., at 630.
31 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36354 U.S. 476 (1957).37 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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Justice Stewart is not the only master of literary style to serve
on the Supreme Court. The analysis set out in the Schenck opin-
ion ultimately rests on the reference to the false cry of "Fire!" in a
theater.38 As this example illustrates, it was Justice Holmes' style
to persuade, not by detailing the facts or the law of the case
before him, but by sketching the striking vignette. His opinions
worked like all good stories, not by retailing the murky and
confusing truth of how things are, but by confirming our felt
certainties about how we know they should be.
The argument equating persuasive law with effective literary
style gains force from the magnitude of Holmes' reputation. The
difficulty with the argument, which became clear in 1897, when
Justice Holmes defined his task as "know[ing] the law, and
.nothing else. . .3' can be seen as a technical one. The view of the
law propounded by Holmes derived from opinions seen in isola-
tion, decisions without precedential effect. Holmes demonstrates
that judges can be persuasive about their resolution of the con-
troversy being adjudicated, but he explains no more.
We are left, therefore, with the question how legal decisions
can justifiably be treated as having precedential effect.
B. The Meaning of that Law.
Acceptance of the federal Supreme Court as authoritative
interpreter of the constitutional text was produced by the read-
ings it gave to the commerce clause. Those readings were pro-
duced by an era of rapid industrialization, and such periods of
history are usually marked by systems of corruption. The scan-
dals accompanying the building of railroads are the most striking
example in American history of this interplay between politics
and eocnomics - an interplay that gives to the concept of com-
petition its ideological power in American thought.
In economic terms, corruption is undertaken to produce prices
above what the market will bear, but such a situation must neces-
sarily produce a new entrant into the market. It is the threat of
competition that keeps a free market operating freely. This guar-
antee against corruption offered by the market operates only in
the long run: the promise projected by the concept of a market is
38 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39 The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) [italics added].
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nevertheless compelling, because of the relative freedom from
constraints it offers to the individual.
A child, once it becomes aware that it is not alone in the world,
could wish for no better universe than an omnipotent mechanism
that automatically registers the shifts in its attention. The free
market offers precisely that, a world in which other people have,
over you, only that power attributable to their own participation
in the mechanism of the market - a universe which provides
exactly what everyone desires except that (at least periodically)
other people attend to matters other than your particular desires.
What this image projected by the concept of the market omits is
structure, the ransom exacted by the passage of time, the ineluc-
table fact experienced by most children as the (arbitrarily) supe-
rior power of their parents; what the twentieth century knows as
capital, the concept Marx created to serve as the moral scapegoat
for injuries inflicted on individuals by the processes of economic
development.
John Maynard Keynes makes plain why, for any given individ-
ual, the threat of competition is not a satisfactory solution to the
problems raised by the existence of structure, the possibilities of
corruption entailed by the possession of power: "In the long run,
we are all dead."40 In legal terms, nonetheless, the appeal of the
concept of competition can be seen in antitrust doctrine, a body
of law incoherent in economic terms precisely because its mes-
sage is the political truth that power corrupts, and that monop-
oly, absolute power in economic terms, corrupts absolutely.
C. The Meaning of Michigan v. Long.
The impact of Justice Holmes' pessimism on the act of judging
was outlined by him in a 1930 letter to Harold J. Laski, where
Holmes says of Justice Brandeis that "his interests are noble, and
as you say his insights profound," but adds: "I told him long ago
that he really was an advocate rather than a Judge. He is affected
by his interest in a cause and if he feels it he is not
detached .... 41
4°See Morrow's International Dictionary of Contemporary Quotations 49 (1982):_
41 Holmes to Laski, December 11, 1930. Holmes Papers, Library of Harvard Law
School.
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The contrast between judge and advocate highlights the issue
of detachment from the situation being considered, a point cen-
tral to an understanding of the story of Solomon's judgment.
Solomon the judge ordered that an infant, an innocent guilty of
no transgression, be cut in half.42 The wisdom of Solomon, that a
mother would not allow her child to be torn asunder, derived
from the political reality that Solomon ruled over a small and
cohesive tribe.
The knowledge that permitted Solomon to act with relative
assurance about the accuracy of his predictions is unfortunately
denied to those who attempt to exercise authority over larger and
more diverse groups. Justice Holmes' "bad man," in other words,
results from a restricted view of human nature. It is unclear,
however, whether, in a society as large and diverse as ours, a
judge can act on the basis of any richer conception of the people
for whom he is making law than that common denominator.
To the problems raised by the existence of equally important
but potentially contradictory human needs, such as individuality
and solidarity or diversity and unity, the dispersion of power
made possible by a federal system can be seen as a solution. A
federal system makes it possible for persons living in a mobile
society to treat state citizenship as an easily changeable formal-
ity. So long as daily activities are either unregulated by law, or
regulated only by state law, such a society permits its citizens to
feel in control of their lives. Subsequent to the Brandeis and
Holmes dissents from decisions invalidating state economic and
social legislation, however, a combination of federal legislative
and administrative law-making in the economic area, combined
with judicial expansion of constitutional guarantees in the social
area, has made law pervasive. Consequently, a determination
that federal activity had not preempted the field would be
required today before Justice Brandeis would be in a position to
treat "a single courageous state['s]... novel social and economic
experiment ... [as] without risk to the rest of the country. '" 43
42 1 Kings 3:16.
43 New England Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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We could accept these changes as verifying Holmes' pessim-
ism about the meaning of experiments in the federal system and
the nature of law. If we do so, however, we must ask whether the
"realistic" detachment of a judge uninterested in the case he is
deciding, a detachment consistent with opinions having no
precedential effect, describes a legal system that society would
support. Law, after all, is a process whose costs are paid by the
people subject to the decisions arrived at, and those costs have
presumably been borne because judicial opinions were per-
ceived to be functioning as precedents, were regarded as pro-
nouncements that could serve as reliable guides to action.
Justice Holmes' pessimism can thus be seen as a denigration of
the activity in which he was engaged. The commitment to the
concept of the "market" found in Schenck signifies an adherence
to the competitive ideal, a recognition of the overriding impor-
tance of testing every attempt to exercise power, of refusing to
accept any formulation as more than an experiment. A focus on
the judicial opinion as an exercise of power, moreover, runs the
risk of ignoring the social function performed by the words con-
tained in the opinion.
Once monarchies give way to republics, political reality
becomes a matter of the will of the people rather than the
monarch, and is therefore as much a matter of words as of per-
sons. It is this truth that is embodied in the aphorism concerning a
government of laws rather than men; and in the context of this
truth laws can be one set of the abstractions in terms of which
humans realize their social being by entering into communities. A
judge, making law in this context, should be aware that some
stories persuade because they distort rather than illuminate real-
ity, and that the proper definition of such an effect is not persua-
sion but seduction. A court, aware of its responsibility when it
undertakes to make law in such a context, should be sensitive to
the significance of the propriety of dissent - to the fact that
every decision not to join the opinion of the Court and every
decision not to follow precedent puts at risk the future of the law.
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